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TAXATION-FEDERAL INCOME TAX-ENJOINING COLLECTION-Taxpayer 
sued to enjoin collection of federal insurance contributions and unemploy-
ment taxes1 with respect to certain fishermen who worked on boats operated 
by the corporate taxpayer. The Government contended that under the In-
ternal Revenue Code an injunction could not be sustained on a showing 
of non-liability.2 The district court issued the injunction on the grounds 
that the tax was illegal because no employer-employee relationship in fact 
existed and that collection of the tax would ruin the corporation finan-
cially.a The court of appeals affirmed, holding that a taxpayer may enjoin 
the collection of a federal tax when he shows its illegality plus special and 
extraordinary circumstances.4 On certiorari to the United States Supreme 
1 INT. REY. CoDE OF 1954, §§ 3121, 3806. A portion of the taxes were claimed to be 
owing under the earlier Int. Rev. Code of 1989, ch. 9, §§ 1426, 1607, 53 Stat. 177, 187. 
2 INT. REY. ConE OF 1954, § 7421(a). "[N]o suit for the purpose of restraining the 
assessment or collection of any tax shall be maintained in any court." See Gouge v. Hart, 
250 Fed. 802 (W.D. Va. 1917) (restraining used in the broad sense of hindering or 
obstructing); Calkins v. Smietanka, 240 Fed. 188 (N.D. Ill. 1917) (assessment includes pre-
liminary investigation). 
a Williams Packing 8c Nav. Co. v. Enochs, 176 F. Supp. 168 (S.D. Miss. 1959). 
4 Enochs v. Williams Packing&: Nav. Co., 291 F.2d 402 (5th Cir. 1961). The decision 
of the court was based on Miller v. Nut Margarine Co., 284 U.S. 498, 509 (1932), where 
it was stated, "[I]n cases where complainant shows in addition to the illegality of an 
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Court, held, reversed. The collection of federal taxes may be enjoined 
only when under the most liberal view of law and fact the Government 
cannot establish its claim at the time of suit, and equity jurisdiction other-
wise exists. Enochs v. Williams Packing & Nav. Co., 370 U.S. 1 (1962). 
Congress, in 1867, absolutely prohibited suits restraining the collection 
or assessment of taxes in language virtually identical to the present prohibi-
tion. 5 The ban against enjoining federal taxes has been justified on the 
theory that the judiciary and the taxpayer should not be able to impede 
the collection of the Government's revenue.6 However, since the inception 
of the prohibition taxpayers, with the aid of the courts, have been tena-
cious and frequently successful in claiming injunctive relief. The federal 
courts began their gradual emasculation of the injunction-prohibiting stat-
ute within three years after its original enactment. In Pullan v. Kinsinger,7 
a case in which an injunction probably would not have been allowed at 
common law,8 the court declared that the prohibition was merely a restate-
ment of the common law, calling it "wholly unnecessary,"9 and further 
stated that it would not apply when the tax was a "nullity." The court did 
not define "nullity," but its intent clearly was to preserve some judicial 
discretion despite the clear congressional prohibition. Other courts, accept-
ing the "nullity" exception, defined it in terms of the assessor lacking jur-
isdiction when the subject matter was clearly not taxable or, alternately, 
as a situation in which by no legal possibility could a valid tax be as-
sessed.10 One court submitted hypothetically that a distilling tax assessed 
on one obviously not in the distilling business would be a "nullity."11 In 
circumventing the prohibition by means of the "nullity" exception, em-
phasis was placed on the impropriety of the tax and no mention was made 
of the possible effect of any special circumstances, such as financial ruin 
exaction in the guise of a tax there exist special and extraordinary circumstances to bring 
the case within some acknowledged head of equity jurisprudence, a suit may be main-
tained to enjoin the collector." 
5 Revenue Act of 1867, ch. 169, § 10, 14 Stat. 475, as amended, REv. STAT. § 3224 
(1875). 
6 See Snyder v. Marks, 109 U.S. 189 (1883); Cadwalader v. Sturgess, 297 Fed. 73 (3d 
Cir. 1924). The statutory means of litigation are intended to be a complete system of 
corrective justice. 
7 20 Fed. Cas. 44 (No. 11463) (C.C.S.D. Ohio 1870). 
8 The collection of both federal taxes, before the prohibition statute was enacted, 
and state taxes could be enjoined under the common law. See Raymond v. Chicago 
Traction Co., 207 U.S. 20, 39 (1907); Shelton v. Platt, 139 U.S. 591 (1891); Dows v. City 
of Chicago, 78 U.S. 108 (1870); Cutting v. Gilbert, 6 Fed. Cas. 1079 (No. 8519) (C.C.S.D.N.Y. 
1865); Magee v. Denton, 16 Fed. Cas. 382 (No. 8943) (C.C.N.D.N.Y. 1863) (dictum); Macklot 
v. Davenport, 17 Iowa 379 (1864); LeRoy v. East Saginaw City Ry., 18 Mich. 233 (1869). 
9 Pullan v. Kinsinger, 20 Fed. Cas. 44, 48 (No. 11463) (C.C.S.D. Ohio 1870). 
10 See Snyder v. Marks, 109 U.S. 189 (1883); Frayser v. Russell, 9 Fed. Cas. 728 (No. 
5067) (C.C.E.D. Va. 1878); Kissinger v. Bean, 14 Fed. Cas. 689, 692 (No. 7853) (C.C.E.D. 
Wis. 1875); Delaware Ry. v. Prettyman, 7 Fed. Cas. 408, 409 (No. 3767) (C.C.D. Del. 
1872). 
11 Kissinger v. Bean, supra note 10. 
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which would be wrought by collection of the tax.12 The Supreme Court 
tacitly recognized the "nullity" e.xception in a case where it first announced 
broadly that the word "tax" in the statutory prohibition included those 
taxes which were alleged to be erroneously or illegally assessed.13 However, 
this statement was qualified to the extent that the statute was said to apply 
only where the Government had jurisdiction over the subject matter, citing 
all the earlier cases which had recognized the "nullity" exception. By means 
of this treatment the Court impliedly distinguished an illegal tax and a 
"nullity." The distinction was merely one of degree, an illegal tax being 
declared as such only after being judged on the merits, while a "nullity" 
related to a tax invalid on its face. 
While this limited exception was being developed with regard to federal 
taxes, the continued impact of decisions holding inapplicable state prohibi-
tions of tax collection injunctions solely upon the presence of special cir-
cumstances soon became evident.14 In 1916 the Supreme Court, although 
denying an injunction, stated that "extraordinary and entirely exceptional 
circumstances," would make the prohibition inapplicable.15 In 1932 the 
Court affirmed the enjoining of collection of an oleomargarine tax in Mil-
ler v. Nut Margarine Co.,16 the leading decision on this subject prior to the 
principal case. The Court held that an in junction would be proper since 
the tax was illegal and there existed requisite special and extraordinary 
circumstances.17 The Court described the tax in Miller as "illegal," though 
meaning no more than unlawful as applied to the particular taxpayer. Even 
in this limited sense, the word "illegal" is particularly unenlightening, since 
it is susceptible of several meanings, ranging from mathematically incorrect 
to something as restrictive as a situation involving obvious lack of juris-
diction. However, in finding "illegality" the Court considered the following 
factors which the taxpayer-manufacturer had relied on as indicia of non-
liability: a recovery of taxes paid by a competitor making a similar prod-
uct,18 an injunction obtained by the competitor when his product was 
again taxed three year later,19 and a ruling by the Commissioner that the 
taxpayer's product was not subject to the oleomargarine tax.20 The special 
and extraordinary circumstance present in Miller was the financial ruin 
12 Cf. Frayser v. Russell, 9 Fed. Cas. 728 (No. 5067) (C.C.E.D. Va. 1878). Here an 
injunction was granted, following the "nullity" exception, although that particular 
word was not used. 
13 Snyder v. Marks, 189 U.S. 189 (1883). 
14 See, e.g., Raymond v. Chicago Traction Co., 207 U.S. 20, 39 (1907); Dows v. City 
of Chicago, 78 U.S. 108 (1870). See also Shelton v. Platt, 139 U.S. 591 (1891), where the 
court stated at 596: "Irreparable injury is the sole ground upon which jurisdiction in 
equity can be regarded as invoked in this case." 
15 Dodge v. Osborn, 240 U.S. 118, 122 (1916). 
16 284 U.S. 498 (1932). Petitioner made a cooking product containing no animal fat. 
The tax was assessed under Oleomargarine Act, ch. 784, §§ 1-7, 32 Stat. 193 (1902). 
17 See note 4 supra. 
18 Higgins Mfg. Co. v. Page, 297 Fed. 644 (D.R.I. 1924). 
19 Higgins Mfg. Co. v. Page, 20 F.2d 948 (D.R.I. 1927). 
20 III-I CUM. BULL. 507 (1924). 
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which would result from collection of the assessed tax, since it is a general 
assumption that a business taxpayer cannot be restored to his former posi-
tion by a successful refund suit after he has sacrificed business assets to ob-
tain the necessary tax money. Thus, Miller required essentially two factors 
-illegality and special circumstances-to provide the basis for enjoining 
tax collection. 
Subsequent to the Miller decision these two factors were not always 
judicially applied in a consistent manner. A fundamental split developed 
between those courts which interpreted the "illegality" requirement of that 
case in the traditional and restricted sense of a "nullity," and those which 
have more recently equated "illegal" with a tax for which the taxpayer, 
after a full consideration on the merits, is found to be not liable. The tax 
denominated as "illegal" in Miller seemed to be what courts had previously 
defined as a "nullity."21 However, the differences in approach in interpret-
• ing "illegality" resulted in substantially variant applications of Mill er. 
Courts which liberally chose to equate the "illegal" of Miller with any 
tax for which the taxpayer ultimately was found to be not liable quite 
naturally found a significantly greater number of such ta.xes than those 
which equated Miller's "illegality" with the older "nullity" concept. The 
nature of the injunction suit, under the liberal approach, became essen-
tially one to determine ultimate tax liability, quite different from the ap-
proach taken by other courts whose only concern was with whether the 
tax could by any legal possibility be valid. 
Subsequent to Miller and prior to the principal case, the manner of 
viewing the "illegality" requirement largely determined the relative im-
portance of the remaining requirement of "special and extraordinary cir-
cumstances." Since the courts which took the traditional view of "illegality" 
seldom found such a tax, this other requirement served as little more than 
a makeweight when such a tax was found.22 Even so, the taxpayer could 
sometimes successfully claim illegality in these courts, either by showing 
that the tax was patently inapplicable, or by suggesting, as in Miller, that 
prior cases settled what may have been initially a close question. On the 
other hand, the courts which adopted the more liberal definition of "ille-
21 The Court intimated this when it stated that "a valid oleomargarine tax could 
by no legal possibility have been assessed against respondent .... " 284 U.S. at 510. 
Indeed, this is the very language used in previous cases to distinguish a merely erroneous 
tax from a "nullity." See, e.g., Kissinger v. Bean, 14 Fed. Cas. 689 (No. 7853) (C.C.E.D. 
Wis. 1875). 
22 See Arnold v. Cobb, 57-2 U.S. Tax Cas. 11 9711 (N.D. Ga.); Long v. United States, 
148 F. Supp. 758 (S.D. Ala. 1957); Long v. Kelly, 100 F. Supp. 235 (M.D. Ala. 1951); 
Strang v. Maloney, 43-1 U.S. Tax Cas. ,I 9294 (D.N.J.); Driscoll v. Jones, 19 F. Supp. 
792 (N.D. Okla. 1937); cf. Burke v. Mingori, 128 F.2d 996 (10th Cir. 1942). Contra, Long 
v. Grey, 130 F. Supp. 194 (W.D. Ky. 1955). However, the "illegality requirement could 
be rigidly applied, as in one case where $500,000 in liens destroyed a taxpayer's business 
under a jeopardy assessment. The court held that the tax was "legal" since, admittedly, 
$1,700 was due. Melvin Bldg. Co. v. Long, 262 F.2d 920 (7th Cir. 1958). See also Mensik 
v. Long, 261 F.2d 45 (7th Cir. 1958), reversing 58-2 U.S. Tax. Cas. 11 9794 (N.D. Ill.). 
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gality" found the "special circumstance" requirement a more suitable de-
vice for restricting the issuance of injunctions.23 Illustratively, one court 
following this approach conceded that the tax might be "illegal," thus 
evading trying the merits of the tax, but denied the injunction because of 
an absence of "special circumstances."24 It characterized an allegation of 
loss of home, business and all worldly possessions as involving a mere hard-
ship. Seemingly a disbelief in the claim of illegality colored the court's in-
terpretation of "special circumstances." However, another court taking the 
liberal approach to "illegality" issued injunctions in two cases on the 
strength of "special circumstances" found in the destruction of the respec-
tive business and intangible business assets which would have resulted from 
the tax collection.25 
In the principal case, the Supreme Court upheld the more restricted 
"nullity" interpretation of Miller, doing so carefully and without using 
the ambiguous term "illegal." The order granting an injunction was re-
versed when the Court found that under the most liberal view of law and 
fact the Government had some chance of prevailing.26 The Court made it 
quite clear that a suit for injunctive relief in a district court is not to be 
utilized as a non-statutory method for trying the merits of a tax liability 
controversy. This rule seems just in those cases where the Code allows the 
diligent taxpayer to try his tax liability in the Tax Court prior to pay-
ment.27 However, where the Code makes no provision for a Tax Court 
proceeding prior to payment, as in the principal case, legislative reform 
may be needed to relieve the taxpayer of the often damaging results of 
prior collection. 
D. Michael Kratchman, S.Ed. 
23 In some recent cases, the courts have abandoned the "illegality" requirement, and 
have granted injunctions on the strength of the "special circumstances." These cases all 
involved a violation of the Internal Revenue Code in the process of collection. Although 
the cases themselves cited Miller, they could have rested on the ground that collection 
may be enjoined when proper procedure is not followed. The cases have not been cited 
as authority for generally abandoning the "illegality" requirement of Miller. See Smith 
v. Flin, 261 F.2d 781 (8th Cir. 1958), modified per curiam, 264 F.2d 523 (8th Cir. 1959); 
Yoke v. Mazzello, 202 F.2d 508 (4th Cir. 1953); Yoshimura v. Alsup, 167 F.2d 104 (9th 
Cir. 1948); Mrizek v. Long, 187 F. Supp. 830 (N.D. Ill. 1959). 
24 Morton v. White, 174 F. Supp. 446 (E.D. Ill. 1959). 
25 Midwest Haulers, Inc. v. Brady, 128 F.2d 496 (6th Cir. 1942). See also John M. 
Hirst & Co. v. Gentsch, 133 F.2d 247 (6th Cir. 1943). But see Martin v. Andrews, 238 
F.2d 552 (9th Cir. 1956); Reams v. Vrooman-Fehn Printing Co., 140 F.2d 237 (6th Cir. 
1944); Communist Party U.S.A. v. Moysey, 141 F. Supp. 332 (S.D.N.Y. 1956), all of which 
cast doubt on the allegation of business ruin as a special circumstance. 
26 For a case where a court of appeals held the fishermen were not employees, 
see Gulf Coast Shrimpers 8: Oyster Ass'n v. United States, 236 F.2d 658 (5th Cir. 1956). 
This may be an unarticulated reason for that court calling the tax "illegal," even in 
the sense of the Miller definition. 
27 The jurisdiction of the Tax Court has generally been limited by the Internal 
Revenue Code of 1954 and other statutes to three general types of taxes: income and 
profits taxes, estate taxes, and gift ta.xes. 9 MERTENS, LAW OF FEDERAL INCOME TAXATION 
§ 50.08 (rev. ed. 1958). It appears that the Tax Court has never had jurisdiction over 
cases involving excise taxes. Id. at § 50.14. 
